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ABSTRACT
Software dataplanes are emerging as an alternative to tradi-
tional hardware switches and routers, promising programma-
bility and short time to market. These advantages are set
against the concern of introducing buggy or under-performing
code into the network. We explore whether it is practical to
formally prove that a software dataplane satisfies key prop-
erties that would ensure smooth network operation. In gen-
eral, proving properties of real programs remains an elusive
goal, but we argue that dataplanes are different: they typi-
cally follow a pipeline structure that enables our proposed
approach, in which we verify pieces of the code in isola-
tion, then compose the results to reason about the entire dat-
aplane. We preliminarily demonstrate the potential of our
approach by applying it on simple Click pipelines and prov-
ing that they are crash-free and execute a bounded number
of instructions. This takes on the order of minutes, whereas
a general-purpose state-of-the-art verifier fails to complete
the same task within 12 hours.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.6 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Internetwork-
ing; D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Ver-
ification
General Terms
Design, Performance, Reliability, Verification
Keywords
Dataplane Verification, Programmable Routers
1. INTRODUCTION
Software dataplanes are emerging as an alternative to tra-
ditional hardware switches and routers. In the last five years,
the industry and research communities have produced a rapid
succession of software prototypes and products that perform
IP forwarding [12, 17], packet classification [24], encryp-
tion [18], or application acceleration [2] at line rates of tens
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of Gbps, which a few years back were achievable only by
specialized hardware.
The main advantage of software dataplanes is flexibility:
They make it possible to significantly cut network provi-
sioning costs by dynamically allocating packet-processing
tasks to network devices [27]; or to turn the Internet into an
evolvable architecture that adapts to the needs of its users
and operators, by continuously updating the functionality
of devices located at strategic network points [26]. Indus-
try is also listening: Intel recently announced its interest
in the development of a “composable software data plane,”
which will enable dynamic composition of different packet-
processing elements [4].
Such flexibility is set against the concern that software
dataplanes will introduce buggy and under-performing code
in the network. When we presented earlier results on soft-
ware packet processing to router manufacturers, most of their
questions were not about feasibility, but about the cost of
programmability, e.g., “if we allow third-party code to be
added into the dataplane, there will be functionality and per-
formance bugs, and who will absorb the extra cost of cus-
tomer support”? This concern is justified, given the history
of transitioning from hardware to software implementations
in other domains (e.g., the consumer electronics or car in-
dustry), where software has dramatically increased the speed
with which new features are implemented, but there is a per-
ception that it has also led to products that are more fragile
and more likely to misbehave [3, 9].
Is it practically feasible to prove that a software dataplane
satisfies key properties that would ensure smooth network
operation? Or must we accept that they will always be less
predictable than their hardware counterparts? When we say
“software dataplane,” we mean a directed graph of distinct
packet-processing elements (e.g., an IP lookup element, a
filtering element, an IP options element) that are combined
into a pipeline using a framework like Click [22].
We explore the feasibility of an automated verification
tool that takes as input either the source code or the ex-
ecutable binary of a software pipeline and proves that the
pipeline does (or does not) satisfy a target property. We care
for properties that, in the case of hardware dataplanes, are ei-
ther taken for granted or can be proved using practical tech-
niques [19–21, 25, 28]: “crash freedom,” which means that
no packet sequence can cause the dataplane to stop execut-
ing; “bounded latency,” which means that no packet experi-
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ences more than a known, reasonable amount of latency; or
higher-level reachability properties, e.g., “any packet with
destination IP address X will never be dropped unless it is
malformed.”
Each proof should hold for any sequence of incoming pack-
ets. If the tool proves that a target property is not satisfied,
it should provide example packet sequences that cause the
property to be violated (e.g, if it cannot prove that a pipeline
will never crash, then it should provide example packet se-
quences for which it does crash). Certain properties (like
crash-freedom and bounded-latency) should be proved for
any pipeline configuration, while others can only be proved
for a specific configuration. E.g., if we want to prove that
a pipeline will never drop a well-formed packet with desti-
nation IP address X , such a proof is meaningful only for a
specific forwarding and filtering table.
In general, automatically proving properties of real pro-
grams (unlike searching for bugs) remains an elusive goal
for the systems community, especially for programs that are
written in a low-level language like C++ and consist of more
than a few hundred lines of code. Despite promising results
from the programming-language community, we are still far
from the point where we can input a program into a verifier
and obtain a proof—even for simple programs like the UNIX
coreutils and simple properties like crash-freedom [7]. This
is due to the structure of real programs, where different pieces
of code often share access to the same state, resulting in de-
pendencies that are hard—often infeasible—to reason about,
even with the help of sophisticated verification tools.
Our thesis is that, unlike general programs, software data-
planes have a special structure that is particularly amenable
to verification: they typically consist of distinct packet-proces-
sing elements that communicate with each other through a
well-defined, narrow interface and do not share mutable state.
This special structure has the following implication: it is
possible to reason about the behavior of the entire dataplane
without treating it as a single piece of code; instead, we can
reason about each element in isolation and efficiently com-
pose the results to reason about the entire dataplane. We will
argue that this can be leveraged to sidestep certain funda-
mental problems faced by software verification and enable
the practical construction of proofs.
For general programs, verifiability and performance are
typically competing goals: a low-level language like C++ is
typically good for performance but makes verification hard,
while a language like Haskell may make it easier to verify
certain properties but harder to achieve good performance.
For software dataplanes, it does not have to be this way: we
will argue that we can write them in a way that preserves per-
formance and enables verification. The key question then is:
what defines a “software dataplane” and how much more re-
stricted is it than a “general program”? I.e., how much do we
need to restrict our dataplane programming model so that we
can achieve verifiability without giving up on performance?
2. MOTIVATION AND SETUP
Use Cases.
The most obvious users of a verification tool for software
dataplanes would be the developers of packet-processing code:
Reasoning about the behavior of a packet-processing ele-
ment E is hard enough; reasoning about what E will do
when part of a bigger pipeline is even harder. Our tool would
help by checking, for any given design or implementation
choice inE, what would be the impact on one (or more) big-
ger pipelines that include E. It would also provide concrete
examples of packet sequences that lead to a segmentation
fault, a kernel panic, a division by 0, a failed assertion, or a
counter overflow. Today, developers are forced to perform
extensive testing before release; our tool would make them
more productive by focusing their attention on the most rel-
evant test cases.
A second set of users would be network operators: When
a new, interesting type of packet processing becomes avail-
able (e.g., a new form of intrusion detection or application
acceleration), an operator may want to include this as a new
element E in the pipelines running on its network devices.
Today, the operator has no effective way of assessing the
consequences of such an upgrade on the network as a whole;
at best, it can test for a while and deploy widely after gain-
ing some level of confidence that there will be no dire con-
sequences. As a result, trying out new packet-processing
software is time-consuming and potentially dangerous. A
dataplane verification tool would change this by providing a
way to check what would be the impact on the currently run-
ning pipelines, e.g., what would be the maximum increase in
latency or energy consumption that the new element would
introduce. Such information would enable faster and safer
deployment, ultimately making operators less conservative
in trying out new packet-processing software.
A third—and perhaps most interesting—use case targets
future markets for packet-processing elements that are sim-
ilar to today’s app markets (Apple AppStore, Google Play,
etc.) Such markets would allow network operators to “go
shopping” for new packet-processing elements that they can
then drop into the dataplanes of their network devices. Our
tool would help by enabling the app-market operator to for-
mally certify that the desired element will not disrupt the
customer’s pipeline.
Our Approach.
We are exploring an approach that consists of two steps:
The first one processes each pipeline element in isolation
and identifies “suspect” packet sequences that may cause the
target property to be violated. This can be done efficiently
and completely (without false-negatives), assuming each el-
ement typically consists of relatively short and simple code
(more on this below). However, the results of the first step
may not be sound (may have false-positives), because it does
not take into account the interactions between different el-
ements. False-positives are eliminated in the second step,
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which examines each suspect packet sequence and verifies
whether it can indeed cause the target property to be violated
given the interactions between all the involved elements.
This would not work for any program; we believe (and
have preliminary evidence that) it works for software pipelines
because these consist of relatively short and simple elements
that do not share mutable state. Because of this special struc-
ture, we can quickly eliminate the majority of packet se-
quences as harmless (first step), which leaves a significantly
smaller number of potentially harmful packet sequences that
need to be examined in more detail (second step).
We rely on fundamental ideas contributed by the program-
ming-language community, but we cannot “simply adjust”
existing tools to solve our problem: We use symbolic ex-
ecution [7, 14], a form of path-sensitive dynamic program
analysis, to identify suspect packet sequences in a single el-
ement; akin to compositional test generation [5, 13, 15], we
process each element once, even if it may be called from dif-
ferent points in the pipeline. These ideas have existed for a
long time, however, they have been applied toward different
goals (increasing line coverage and/or finding bugs), so we
cannot use existing incarnations of these ideas to solve our
problem.
Symbolic Execution.
A program can be represented as a tree, where each path
from the root to a leaf corresponds to a different instruction
sequence, and each internal node corresponds to a branching
point (Fig. 1). During normal execution of the program, each
variable is assigned a concrete value, and only a single path
of the tree is executed. In contrast, during symbolic execu-
tion (from now on “symbex,” for brevity), a variable may be
symbolic, i.e., assigned a set of values that is specified by an
associated constraint. E.g., a symbolic integer x with asso-
ciated constraint x > 2 ∧ x < 5 is the set of concrete values
x = {3, 4}. A symbex engine can take a program, make the
program’s input symbolic, and execute all the paths that are
feasible given this input.
Consider the toy program in Fig. 1 and assume that the
input in can take any integer value. To symbolically execute
this program, we start at the root of the tree and execute all
the feasible paths. As we go down each path, we collect two
pieces of information: the “path constraint” specifies which
values of in lead to this path, while the “symbolic state”
maps each variable to its current value on this path. E.g., at
the end of path p2, the path constraint isC = (in ≥ 0∧in <
10), while the symbolic state is S = {out 7→ 10}; at the end
of path p3, the path constraint is C = (in ≥ 10), while the
symbolic state is S = {out 7→ in}.
Proof by Execution.
If we can execute all the feasible paths of a program and
verify that none of them violates a target property, that con-
stitutes proof that the entire program satisfies this property.
E.g., suppose we want to prove that the program in Fig. 1
never executes more than 10 instructions. We can do this by
out Program ( in ):
   assert in ≥ 0
   if in < 10 then
      out ← 10
   else
      out ← in
   end if
   return out
0 
≤ 
in
 <
 1
0 in
 ≥ 10
in
 <
 0
in
 ≥ 0
crash
return 10 return in
p1
p2 p3
Figure 1: A toy program and its execution tree.
symbexing the program with a symbolic input in that may
take any value, executing all three feasible paths, and veri-
fying that none of them includes more than 10 instructions.
Such a proof assumes that the symbex engine itself is cor-
rect and that the hardware operates according to its specifi-
cations.
By constructing proofs in this manner, we can automat-
ically determine all the problematic inputs that prevent us
from completing the proof. E.g., suppose we try to prove
that the program in Fig. 1 never crashes. We symbex the
program with a symbolic input in that may take any value,
and we discover three feasible paths: one for in < 0, one for
0 ≤ in < 10, and one for in ≥ 10. We can argue that the last
two paths cannot cause the program to crash, however, the
first path ends with a failed assertion—a crash. So, we have
failed to prove that the program satisfies the target property,
but we have also uncovered all the input values (in < 0) that
cause the property to be violated.
Proving 6= Bug Finding.
Proof by execution can be rarely used in practice, because
of path explosion [6]: The sheer number of feasible paths
in a real program (even one that consists of a few hundred
lines of code) is typically so large that it is impossible to
execute all of them in useful time. This is because the num-
ber of paths generally grows exponentially in the number of
branching points. Even small programs, like UNIX core-
utils, have an intractable number of feasible paths because
of their use of essential libraries like libc [7].
Because of this challenge, symbolic execution can rarely
be used for proofs, even though it is often (and success-
fully) used for identifying good input values for testing, as
well as input values that are likely to cause bugs to mani-
fest. We should clarify that 100% line coverage (i.e., ex-
ercising each line of code at least once) is not the same as
exploring 100% of a program’s feasible paths. In fact, so-
phisticated tools may achieve good line coverage for small
and simple programs, yet explore only a small fraction of the
feasible paths. For instance, when Klee [7] symbolically ex-
ecutes UNIX coreutils like nice or cat, it achieves more than
70% line coverage, but executes less than 1% of the feasible
paths [23]. This is fine when the goal is to discover interest-
ing paths (e.g., to uncover bugs), but not when the goal is to
exercise all feasible paths (to prove properties).
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3. OUR PROPOSAL
We observe that symbolic execution is a good fit for packet-
processing pipelines, because their special structure can help
sidestep path explosion: Intuitively, the fact that there are no
state interactions between different pipeline elements (other
than one passing a packet to another) makes it feasible to
reason about each element in isolation, then compose the re-
sults to reason about the entire pipeline. This reduces by an
exponential factor the amount of work that needs to be done
to prove something about the pipeline: If each element has
n branches and roughly 2n paths, a pipeline of k such el-
ements has roughly 2k·n paths. Verifying each element in
isolation—as opposed to the entire pipeline in one piece—
cuts the number of paths that need to be explored roughly
from 2k·n to k · 2n.
Pipeline Structure.
We consider packet-processing pipelines where each ele-
ment may access the following three types of state:
Packet state is owned by exactly one element at any point
in time. It can be read or written only by its owner; the cur-
rent owner (and nobody else) may atomically transfer own-
ership to another element. Packet state is used for commu-
nicating packet content and metadata between elements. For
each newly arrived packet, there is typically an element that
reads it from the network, creates a packet object, and trans-
fers object ownership to the next element in the pipeline.
Once an element has transferred ownership of a packet, it
cannot read or write it any more.
Private state is owned by one element and never changes
ownership. It can be read or written only by its owner, and it
persists across the processing of multiple packets. A typical
example is a flow table in a NetFlow element, or a map in an
element that performs Network Address Translation (NAT).
Static state can be read by any element but not written by
any element. This state is immutable as far as the pipeline is
concerned. A typical example is an IP forwarding table.
This structure is not accidental: it is a natural fit for any
platform that must perform high-performance streaming. The
alternative would be to allow multiple stages of the pipeline
to share read/write access to the same data, which would
require additional synchronization, e.g., through locking, a
typical cause of contention and unpredictable performance.
Pipelines that are created with Click conform to this struc-
ture, and these arguably constitute the majority of research
prototypes. Similar information about industrial prototypes
is not typically disclosed, but we know of at least one com-
pany that uses Click [1].
Pipeline Decomposition.
We now describe our two-step verification process in more
detail: First, we cut each pipeline path into small segments
(defined below). In Step 1, we capture the outcome of each
segment symbolically and, once we’ve done so, we never
need to execute that segment again, because we’ve distilled
it into its “essence”: how that segment transforms state. In
out E1 ( in ):
   if in < 0 then
      out ← 0
   else
      out ← in
   end if
   return out
out E2 ( in ):
   assert in ≥ 0
   if in < 10 then
      out ← 10
   else
      out ← in
   end if
   return out
out ToyPipeline ( in ):
   out1 ← E1 ( in )
   out2 ← E2 ( out1 )
   return out2
in
 <
 0
in ≥ 0
in
 <
 0
in
 ≥ 0
return 0 return in
0 
≤ 
in
 <
 1
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 <
 0
in
 ≥ 0
crash
return 10 return in
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≤ 
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< 
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in
’ 
< 
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< 
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Figure 2: A toy pipeline that consists of two elements.
Step 2, we cast the proof process as a search (in isolation, at
the element level) for segments that might violate the desired
property, and then simply check whether, once we assemble
elements into the desired pipeline, any of these potential vi-
olations are still feasible. This search is complete, in that we
do not miss any potential violations, and sound, in that we
do not introduce behavior that the code does not have; the
net result is sound and complete, thus being a correct proof.
We illustrate our setup in Fig. 2: We represent the pipeline
as a tree that consists of subtrees, one per packet-processing
element; a subtree representing element Ei will appear mul-
tiple times in the tree, once for each feasible path that may
lead to Ei. The input in corresponds to a newly received
packet; we assume that this may contain anything, i.e., in
symbex terminology, in is a symbolic bit vector. We de-
fine a segment to be a complete path through one element,
and a path to be a complete execution path through an en-
tire pipeline; a path through a pipeline of k elements is a
concatenation of k segments.
In Step 1, we verify each element individually: We sym-
bex the element assuming unconstrained symbolic input, and
we conservatively tag as “suspect” all the feasible segments
that may cause the target property to be violated. E.g., if the
target property is that the pipeline never crashes, then every
segment that leads to a crash is tagged as suspect. As a by-
product, we obtain the constraint C and symbolic state S at
the end of every feasible segment.
If this step does not yield any suspect segments for any el-
ement, we are done: the pipeline satisfies the target property.
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E.g., if none of the elements ever crashes for any input, we
have proved that the pipeline will never crash.
A suspect segment does not necessarily mean that the pipeline
can violate the target property, because a segment that is fea-
sible in the context of an individual element may become in-
feasible in the context of the full pipeline. E.g., in Fig. 2,
if we consider element E2 alone, segment e3 is feasible,
and it causes the element to crash; however, in a platform
where E2 always follows E1, segment e3 becomes infeasi-
ble, and the platform never crashes. In program analysis ter-
minology, when we explore all the feasible segments of each
individual element assuming arbitrary input, we are “over-
approximating,” i.e., we are executing some elements with
inputs that they would never see when part of the pipeline
we are aiming to verify.
In Step 2, we check if the suspect segments could violate
the target property when part of the pipeline: First, we con-
struct each potential path pi that includes at least one sus-
pect segment; pi is a sequence of segments ej . Next, we
stitch together the path constraint for pi and the resulting
symbolic state based on the constraints and symbolic state
of its constituent segments (that we have already obtained in
Step 1). Finally, we determine whether path pi is feasible
(based on its constraint) and whether it violates the target
property (based on its symbolic state), without ever actually
executing pi.
E.g., here is how we prove that the pipeline in Fig. 2 does
not crash:
Step 1:
1. We symbexE1 assuming input in can take any integer
1
value. We collect constraints C1 and C2, and symbolic
state S1 and S2, for its segments e1 and e2:
• C1(in) = (in < 0), S1(in) = {out 7→ 0}.
• C2(in) = (in ≥ 0), S2(in) = {out 7→ in}.
2. We symbex E2 assuming input in can take any integer
value. We collect the following constraints and sym-
bolic state for its segments e3, e4, and e5:
• C3(in) = (in < 0), S3(in) = {crash}.
• C4(in) = (in ≥ 0 ∧ in < 10),
S4(in) = {out 7→ 10}.
• C5(in) = (in ≥ 10), S5(in) = {out 7→ in}.
3. Segment e3 may cause a crash, so we tag it as suspect.
Step 2:
1. The paths that include the suspect segment are p1 (i.e.,
sequence< e1, e3 >) and p4 (i.e., sequence< e2, e3 >).
1We use integer input for illustration purposes. In reality, the input
to each element is a symbolic bit vector.
2. We compute p1’s path constraint as
Cp1(in) = C1(in) ∧ C3( S1(in) [out ] )
= C1(in) ∧ C3( 0 )
= (in < 0) ∧ (0 < 0).
3. Path p1’s constraint always evaluates to false, hence p1
is infeasible, i.e., there is no way the pipeline could
execute path p1. Similarly, we establish that p4 is in-
feasible.
4. Since all the feasible paths consist of non-suspect seg-
ments (that never crash), the platform never crashes.
Element Verification.
Our approach assumes that symbexing each element in
isolation is feasible. So far, we have been able to symbex all
the elements we have experimented with (reported below),
but not before resolving two significant challenges: loops
and mutable data structures. For lack of space, we only out-
line the main ideas behind our techniques.
The main challenge we encountered was the presence of
loops (e.g., the one executed when processing IP options),
which create many paths even within a single element. E.g.,
if we symbexed (in isolation) the IP options element that
comes with Click, we roughly estimated that we would have
to execute millions of segments, which would take months to
complete. To resolve this, we reuse the idea of decomposi-
tion, but apply it at a different level: If a loop has t iterations,
we view it as a sequence of t “mini-elements,” each one cor-
responding to one iteration of the loop. In the “pipeline de-
composition” part, we said that we symbex each element in
isolation, then compose the results to reason about the entire
pipeline. Similarly, we symbex one mini-element in isola-
tion, then use the results to reason about the entire loop.
The other challenge we encountered was the presence of
mutable data structures, e.g., a hash table for per-flow statis-
tics or a map for network address translation (NAT). Symbex
engines still lack the semantics to deal with data structures
in a scalable manner; symbexing an element that contains,
e.g., access to an array with 1 million entries will cause a
symbex engine to essentially branch into 1 million different
segments, independently from the array content or the logic
of the code that uses the returned value. To resolve this,
we separate the verification of a stateful element into two
distinct parts: (1) verification of the code that accesses data
structures and (2) verification of the rest of the code.
To verify the rest of the code, we model each data struc-
ture as a key/value store that supports only a read and a write
function, and we assume that a read may return either a value
that was previously written in the data structure or a default
value. First, we symbex the element assuming that a read to
a data structure may return any value (the variable that stores
the return value is marked symbolic and unconstrained), and
we identify all the “bad” values that, if read from the data
structure, will cause the target property to be violated. Sec-
ond, we go back and check whether any input to the element
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may have caused any of these bad values to be written to the
data structure in the first place.
To verify code that accesses data structures, we are taking
a pragmatic approach: use either data structures that have
been previously verified by experts [29], or data structures
that can be efficiently verified using static analysis. For in-
stance, verifying code that accesses arrays can be efficiently
done using static analysis, due to the simplicity of array se-
mantics. Fortunately, most packet-processing functionality
can be implemented using pre-allocated arrays, and this is
not by accident: Packet-processing elements typically main-
tain their private state in pre-allocated hash tables/maps that
provide O(1) lookup time, so that they can access it at line
rate; these data structures can be easily implemented as array
chains. Even longest prefix matching (often implemented on
tries) is amenable to an array-based implementation, as long
as we are willing to throw memory at the problem [16].
Preliminary Results.
To test the potential of these ideas, we applied them on
packet-processing pipelines developed with Click, to answer
two questions: (a) is there any input that can make the pipeline
crash? (b) which is the maximum number of instructions
that each pipeline may ever execute and which input causes
it? We used a Xeon-based server running SMPClick [10]. In
all the pipelines we tried, packets are generated by a “gen-
erator” element and dropped by a “sink” element; what we
verify is all the packet-processing code between the two. We
used S2E [11] as our underlying symbex engine.
We first verified pipelines that combine elements from
the default Click IP-Router configuration (Classifier, EthEn-
cap/EthDecap, CheckIPhdr, IPlookup, DecTTL, IP options).
We proved that any pipeline that consists of these elements
will not crash for any input. We also proved that the longest
pipeline (that consists of all these elements) executes up to
about 3600 instructions per packet, and we also identified
the packet that yields this maximum result.
For the longest pipeline, our verification time was about
18 minutes; in contrast, when we fed the same code to the
symbex engine (without using pipeline decomposition or any
of the other presented ideas), verification did not complete
within 12 hours.
We are currently experimenting with pipelines that con-
tain more sophisticated elements, e.g., that collect NetFlow-
style statistics or perform NAT functionality.
The pipelines that we verified may be conceptually sim-
ple, but they include processing that is challenging from a
verification point of view: large numbers of branching points,
loops, and mutable data structures. The fact that we were
able to verify them within minutes or tens of minutes consti-
tutes encouraging evidence.
4. DISCUSSION
How about model checking or a special language? We
have not precluded the option of using model checking to
verify individual elements, e.g., it may be a good alternative
to static verification of data structures. For certain low-level
properties, using a special language or environment guaran-
tees a priori that the property holds, e.g., writing a program
in Java or running it in a sandbox guarantees that the pro-
gram will never perform illegal memory accesses. For most
properties, however, one would have to develop special lan-
guages, whereas we are interested in verifying software data-
planes written in a popular language like C++ and optimized
for high performance.
Howmuch are we giving up for verifiability? We are re-
stricting ourselves to pipelines where different stages do not
share mutable state. We think this is necessary, because state
creates dependencies among the pieces of code that share it,
and more dependencies are equivalent to more constraints,
which increase verification time. Hence, controlling verifi-
cation time comes down to restricting the range of code that
accesses the same state. We think this restriction is accept-
able, because pipeline states are mostly designed anyway to
be independent from each other for performance reasons.
Our claim then is that, in the context of packet-processing
pipelines at least, state isolation per pipeline stage is rea-
sonable to expect, since we mostly do it anyway for perfor-
mance.
What about non-verifiable elements? There will al-
ways be some forms of packet processing that we will not be
able to verify—perhaps deep-packet inspection fundamen-
tally requires dynamically-growing data structures that are
not statically verifiable. We are not advocating to reject such
non-verifiable code; network operators will always have the
option to deploy it, but they will have to be more conserva-
tive in doing so, as there will be no assurance about what that
code will do to their network (which is what happens with
all dataplane software today).
Why not verify the control plane? We are focusing on
dataplane software verification, because we believe it is an
equally worthy goal that has received no attention, perhaps
because it is mistakenly considered easy. We should also
clarify that we cannot use bug-finding tools for control-plane
applications [8] to prove dataplane properties. These tools
were designed to find bugs, not produce proofs, i.e., they
cannot reason about all the paths of a software dataplane.
Is this Active Networking? No, because we are not con-
sidering code-carrying packets, and we are focusing on ex-
isting, popular languages like C++ and platforms like Click.
But we are sharing a similar vision: of a programmable data-
plane, where the operator “drops in” new packet-processing
code without risking to destabilize network operation.
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